This paper investigates the e¤ect of location-speci…c competition and diversity on manufacturing growth. Using detailed manufacturing data from Morocco, we …nd strong and robust evidence of agglomeration e¤ects: competition is good for growth but diversity is not. However, in our study country these e¤ects do not appear to be channelled through productivity or wages. First, agglomeration variables have opposite e¤ects on growth and on individual …rm productivity. Second, controlling for productivity directly does not reduce the signi…cance or magnitude of agglomeration variables. In the study country, agglomeration variables measure something that is relevant for manufacturing growth, but it is not productivity. We also …nd that a rise in average productivity raises subsequent employment and investment, but has no e¤ect on …rm entry and exit.
Introduction
Since Marshall, agglomeration externalities have long attracted the attention of economists (e.g., Henderson 1988, Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999) and geographers alike (e.g., Isard 1956 , Jacobs 1969 , Dicken and Lloyd 1990 . Various sources of externalities have been hypothesized in the literature. Some are thought to raise the productivity of individual …rms directly, for instance through the sharing of technological or market-related information (e.g., Arrow 1962, Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1992) . Others are believed to raise pro…ts by reducing transport costs, for example because of closer proximity to consumers and input providers (e.g., Krugman 1991 , Rodriguez-Clare 1996 . The …rst case corresponds to Marshallian externalities, the second to pecuniary externalities.
Much of the empirical literature on agglomeration externalities focuses on employment growth (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992 , Ellison and Glaeser 1997 , Henderson 1997 , Combes 2000 , Bun and El Makhlou… 2007 , with the exception of Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004) who also look at …rm entry and exit. In order to disentangle pure locational advantages from agglomeration e¤ects, the literature has relied on dynamic panel analysis whereby sectoral employment growth is regressed on proxy variables capturing agglomeration externalities that vary across locations. Panel analysis o¤ers the advantage of controlling for time-invariant location e¤ects, such as geographical advantage. Using this approach, agglomeration e¤ects have been shown to be a strong determinant of employment growth (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992 , Henderson 1997 , Combes 2000 , Bun and Makhlou… 2007 and, more recently, of …rm entry (e.g., Combes et al. 2004 ). All these studies assume that agglomeration factors a¤ect manufacturing performance through their e¤ect on productivity, prices, and costs. But, to our knowledge, this has never been tested formally.
This paper examines how the introduction of productivity and wage shock measures in dynamic …rm growth and entry regressions a¤ects the coe¢ cients of agglomeration variables.
Productivity and wage shock measures are constructed from a large exhaustive panel dataset on individual manufacturing …rms at a disaggregated geographical level. Using the same data, Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) have shown that agglomeration e¤ects a¤ect the total factor productivity of individual …rms and the wages they pay their employees. If variables supposed to proxy for agglomeration externalities in ‡uence …rm growth and entry via productivity and wages, the inclusion of direct -albeit imperfect -measures of productivity and wages should reduce the magnitude of their coe¢ cient. Results contradict this conjecture: although productivity and wage shocks are shown to have a strong e¤ect on employment growth and …rm entry, this e¤ect is quite distinct from standard agglomeration variables. We also …nd that agglomeration variables have an e¤ect on employment growth and …rm entry that is quite di¤erent from the e¤ect they have on …rm productivity and wages. It therefore appears that agglomeration variables in dynamic employment growth regressions measure something else than productivity or wages. This paper is organized as follows. Our testing strategy is described in Section 2, in relation to the existing literature. The data are presented in Section 3, together with some descriptive statistics. Econometric analysis is presented in Section 4.
Testing strategy
There is a large literature on agglomeration externalities, much of it focusing on manufacturing.
The theoretical literature is particularly well developed and has identi…ed many di¤erent types of agglomeration e¤ects, some negative (e.g., congestion), some positive (e.g., shared infrastructure). Alfred Marshall, subsequently followed by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1990) , identi…ed knowledge spillover as an important source of externalities. To the extent that knowledge is transferred more easily through direct human contact, local information sharing is thought to give rise to agglomeration externalities of the 'Silicon Valley'type. The shared information need not be on technology; it may also include business opportunities or market relevant knowledge (e.g., Rauch and Casella 2003, Fafchamps, El Hamine and Zeufack 2008) .
Di¤erent views on what shared information is relevant and how it is exchanged have given rise to di¤erent theories regarding the nature of agglomeration e¤ects. One view, attributed to Marshall, Arrow and Romer and hence referred to as the MAR hypothesis by Combes (2000) , claims that monopoly and market power are associated with more innovation and hence with larger externalities. The opposite view is championed by Porter (1990) who argues that monopolies are stultifying and that it is competition that spurs innovation and growth. Both these hypotheses are seen as emphasizing externalities within a sector. In contrast, Jacobs (1984) argues that it is the diversity of industries within cities that is a source of externalities, as industries borrow ideas from each other. The empirical evidence is contradictory. Using US data, Glaeser et al. (1992) …nd in general that local competition and urban diversity, but not specialization, encourage employment growth. In contrast, Henderson (1997) …nds that both specialization and diversity have positive e¤ects on …rm growth but that the former is larger. Using French data, Combes (2000) …nds the opposite result that competition and specialization reduce employment growth while diversity is negative for most industries and positive for services.
Pecuniary externalities have also been proposed as possible explanation for spatial concentration (e.g., Henderson 1988 , Fujita et al. 1999 . For instance, in a large labor market, it is easier and faster for employers to …nd the specialized manpower they need. This phenomenon is called thick labor market externalities by Glaeser et al. (1992) . Forward and backward linkages as initially proposed by Hirschman (1958) are another possibility. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) , for instance, construct a model where a larger market triggers entry in intermediate input production, thereby generating gains from specialization (e.g., Ciccone and Matsuyama 1996 , Fafchamps and Helms 1996 , Fafchamps 1997 . Market size also matters. Krugman (1991) , for instance, illustrates how proximity to larger market may attract industries if transport costs are neither too high nor too low. In this paper, we examine both types of externalities.
The empirical literature on externalities and industrial development remains unsettled (e.g, Tybout 2000). Glaeser et al. (1992) , for instance, conclude that competition and diversity favor …rm growth. In contrast, Henderson (1997) and Desmet and Fafchamps (2005) conclude that own-sector externalities are much stronger than those generated by other sectors. In his study of French manufacturing and services, Combes (2000) concludes that competition and total local employment have a negative e¤ect on …rm growth while Bun and El Makhlou… (2007) concludes that diversity has a positive e¤ect but competition a negative one. Using a di¤erent methodology, Ciccone and Hall (1996) …nd that employment density increases average labor productivity. Combes et al. (2004) argue that contradictory results may be driven by slight di¤erences in methodology. They insist that a consistent set of regressors needs to be used to obtain meaningful results. Using a set of agglomeration variables similar to that of Combes et al. (2004) , Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) use …rm-level data to provide evidence of a signi…cant e¤ect on productivity and wages. They …nd that returns to specialization are strong and large in magnitude and that the net e¤ect of competition on productivity and wages tends to be negative.
Their analysis shows that competition tends to lower wages, probably because of thick labor market externalities. They also …nd some limited evidence in favor of the diversity argument put forth by Jacobs (1984) . Thompson (2004) shows that input-output linkages matter for agglomeration externalities.
In this paper we seek to understand the growth of manufacturing over time. Probably due to data limitations, earlier papers have followed Glaeser at al. (1992) and focused on changes in employment levels over time as measure of manufacturing growth. Here we take advantage of richer data to include not only employment but also total output, investment, and changes in the number of …rms.
At the heart of most analyses of sectoral dynamics is the idea that a variable of interest y ittypically the level of economic activity in a given country or location i -tends towards a steady state y i . If we linearize the law of motion of y around its steady state or mean, we obtain a linear di¤erence equation:
(2.1) Equation (2.1) implies that growth y it is faster the further away y it is from y . This is common sense: if y it is converging towards y , it must eventually slow down as it reaches y . Parameter expresses the speed with which y it converges to its steady state: if = 1, convergence is instantaneous; if is small but positive, convergence is slow; if < 0, y it does not move towards y i but in fact moves away from it.
Following Quah (1993) and Desmet and Fafchamps (2006) , it is straightforward to extend the above model to allow for stochastic shocks v it , in which case we have:
In this context, y i can be thought of as y it 's conditional mean and as the speed at which y it reverts to its mean. 1
In equation (2.2), it is common to assume that y i depends on speci…c conditions z i prevailing in location i, i.e., to posit that y i = f (z i ). We then write:
In general, researchers are interested not so much in growth itself but in f (z i ) because it is indicative of the long run behavior of y it . By linking the two, equation (2.3) enables researchers to infer something about f (z i ) from the speed of growth: conditioning on y it , equation (2.3) predicts that variables z i that yield a higher steady state y i also increase the growth rate y it .
This yields a testing strategy: regress growth y it on initial condition y it and a set of variables z i thought to a¤ect steady state y i ; if they are seen to speed growth, they should also raise y i , and vice versa. The same reasoning can be extended to time-varying factors z it . In this case, y it can be thought of as following a moving target. As the target moves further away, y it must speed up in order to catch up with it.
The above ideas form the basis of our testing strategy: if variables measuring agglomeration e¤ects speed up growth, this is seen as evidence that they generate positive feedbacks raising y i . 2 To illustrate how this works, let Q ijt be total manufacturing output in location i and sector j at time t. By de…nition we have Q ijt = P k2I ijt Q k where k is an individual …rm index and ijt is the set of …rms present in location i and sector j at time t. We wish to know whether Q ijt converges to a steady state or conditional mean that is a¤ected by agglomeration e¤ects.
Our core regression is of the form:
where ij is a location-sector …xed e¤ect, A ijt is a vector of agglomeration variables, P ijt is a set of direct productivity and cost measures, jt is a sector-speci…c time dummy, and u ijt is a residual.
In our earlier notation, 
In the transformed regression, the coe¢ cient of Q ijt represents the speed of adjustment: the smaller it is, the faster adjustment is. Given the presence of …xed e¤ects ij , estimation of (2.5)
by OLS is known to generate inconsistent estimates. To deal with the di¢ culty, a number of alternative instrumental variable and GMM estimators have been proposed in the literature. 3 Di¤erencing the data to eliminate ij , (2.5) can be written:
GMM estimators for (2.6) rely on lagged values of log Q ijt to instrument log Q ijt (e.g., Anderson and Hsiao 1982, Arellano and Bond 1991) . This is, for instance, the approach adopted by Combes (2000) and Combes et al. (2004) . 4 We are also interested in the channel through which agglomeration e¤ects in ‡uence output.
We focus on three possible channels: capital investment, employment, and …rm entry and exit.
Manufacturing growth can occur through the expansion of existing …rms or through an increase in the number of …rms N ijt . As Combes (2000) has shown, which of these two avenues dominates depends on demand elasticity and on the nature of competition. Given that agglomeration externalities are at least in part due to competition, we suspect that agglomeration variables may have a di¤erent e¤ect on …rm expansion than on …rm entry. Let L ijt , K ijt and N ijt denote total employment, capital stock, and number of …rms in location i and sector j at time t, respectively. We begin by estimating a model of the form:
Comparing estimates of parameter vectors and between equations (2.6) and (2.7) should yield the …rst hints on whether agglomeration A ijt and productivity P ijt a¤ect output growth directly or indirectly through investment, hiring, and …rm entry: if agglomeration externalities a¤ect output indirectly by fostering a change in employment, investment, or …rm entry, estimated coe¢ cients and in equation (2.7) should be smaller than in (2.6).
We also examine how employment growth, investment, and …rm entry and exit respond to A ijt and P ijt . Our regressions are of the form:
where X stands for L; K; and N , respectively. Since L ijt , K ijt and N ijt feed back into each other, they are to be regarded as pre-determined variables. Consequently, their …rst di¤erences are all instrumented with lagged levels of L ijt , K ijt and N ijt . We further re…ne this approach by decomposing net …rm entry into sub-components. A net increase in N ijt requires that gross entries N e ijt and …rm in-migration N n ijt from other locations exceeds gross exit N x ijt 1 < 0 and …rm out-migration to other locations N o ijt 1 < 0:
To investigate whether agglomeration externalities and productivity shocks a¤ect entry, exit, and …rm relocation di¤erently, we also estimate models of the form:
for z = fe; n; x; og. This formulation o¤ers the advantage that all estimated coe¢ cients are expressed in terms of their e¤ect on the growth rate of the number of …rms. Since equation (2.8) does not include a lagged dependent variable, the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond does not apply. We nevertheless worry that L ijt , K ijt , and N ijt may be correlated with the …xed e¤ect. For this reason log L ijt ; log K ijt and log N ijt are nonetheless instrumented using lagged levels when estimating (2.8).
We now turn to a description of our regressors. We follow Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) and identify four variables measuring agglomeration e¤ects A ijt : 5 (1) total manufacturing em-5 Combes et al. (2004) also regard Lijt and Nijt as capturing agglomeration e¤ects. We are not comfortable with this interpretation (see below). ployment in location i at time t -L it = P j L ijt ; (2) the total number of manufacturing sectors M it present in location i at time t; (3) a diversity index D it de…ned as
where it is the set of sectors present in location i at time t; and (4) a competition index C ijt de…ned as
Both D it and C ijt are Her…ndahl indices. Complete concentration in a single sector (D it ) or …rm (C ijt ) yields a value of 1. In contrast, if employment is equally shared among sectors, the diversity index becomes:
By the same token, when all …rms are of equal size, C ijt = N ijt . To facilitate interpretation, we normalize D it and C ijt as follows:
Normalized indices vary between 0 (most concentrated) and 1 (least concentrated).
Several of the above variables have been used in one form or another in the literature before, typically in log form. For instance, own sector employment log L ijt is referred to by Henderson (2003) as a localization e¤ect while log L it is said to capture urbanization e¤ects. Sometimes similar variables are given a di¤erent interpretation. Henderson (2003) , for instance, uses N ijt as the number of sources of local information spillover while Combes et al. (2004) regard N ijt alone as a measure of competition. In the work of Glaeser et al. (1992) , it is the (log of the) ratio N ijt =L ijt that is used as a measure of competition. The likely reason for these discrepancies is di¤erences in data availability: authors with di¤erent types of data end up using di¤erent sets of agglomeration variables.
We are not comfortable interpreting the coe¢ cient of log L ijt as measure of agglomeration e¤ects. The reason is that …rms would typically grow even in the absence of agglomeration externalities. Summing over all …rms would generate a relationship between log L ijt and log L ijt even though agglomeration e¤ects are absent. The same reasoning also applies to …rm entry and exit: …rms would enter and exit even in the absence of agglomeration e¤ects. To identify the agglomeration e¤ect of L ijt and N ijt , …rm-level data is required as as to distinguish between factors that are internal and external to individual …rms.
The meaning of each variable depends on the presence or absence of the others: variables can only be interpreted in conjunction with each other. Assuming that all variables enter in logs, L it captures the agglomeration e¤ect due to the presence of a large manufacturing sector.
The e¤ect of specialization L ijt =L it is captured in the coe¢ cient of L ijt , together with growth factors that are internal to …rms. Competition is captured by C ijt which, after normalization, can be interpreted independently from N ijt . If competition generates positive agglomeration externalities, as suggested by Porter, then C ijt should have a positive e¤ect on productivity and hence on …rm growth.
Diversity is captured by two variables, M it and D it . Since we are conditioning on sectoral specialization through L ijt =L it , the variables M it and D it measure the e¤ect of diversity in sectors other than j. For a given level of specialization, …rm performance may increase with the diversity of production in sectors other than the …rm's own sector j. It is this e¤ect that variables M it and D it seek to capture. If diversity in other sectors is good for manufacturing …rms, then we expect both M it and D it to have a positive e¤ect on …rm performance. Comparison of their e¤ects can tell us whether it is the mere presence of a sector that matters or whether it is the equal distribution of employment across sectors.
As we pointed out earlier, agglomeration variables A ijt are meant to proxy for productivity e¤ects due to location externalities (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992 , Henderson 1997 , Combes 2000 , Combes et al. 2004 , Bun and Makhlou… 2007 . In the context of this literature, productivity should be understood in a broad sense: it encompasses the e¤ect that Marshallian and pecuniary externalities can have on the joint productivity of all …rms in a given location. Marshallian externalities raise total factor productivity directly while pecuniary externalities raise output prices and/or lower wage and intermediate input costs. Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) have shown that both total factor productivity and wages are strongly in ‡uenced by agglomeration e¤ects. Consequently, we let the P ijt vector include measures of total factor productivity as well as factor costs.
We estimate all models with and without P ijt variables. Intuitively, if agglomeration variables capture productivity e¤ects, then the inclusion of direct productivity measures P ijt should set the coe¢ cients of agglomeration variables to 0. The validity of this test rests on the assumption that P ijt is measured without error. If measurement error is present, we would expect some of the productivity e¤ects to be capture by A ijt variables, in which case their coe¢ cient may remain signi…cantly di¤erent from 0. But even in this case, we expect to fall in absolute value.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we need to recognize its logic and limitations. First, our focus is on local snowballing e¤ects, i.e., we ask whether location-speci…c variation in productivity or agglomeration variables has a delayed e¤ect that ripples through all sectors in that location. Since we control for location-sector …xed e¤ects and focus on year-to-year variation, long-lasting agglomeration e¤ects are not picked up by our approach. Similarly, since we control for sector-year …xed e¤ects, our approach nets out any time-varying sector-speci…c e¤ect that operates at the level of the country. We also do not consider ripple e¤ects on neighboring locations. Identi…cation of agglomeration e¤ects is achieved solely from observing yearly variation within each sector and location.
Second, our analysis encompasses all locations where manufacturing …rms are found, including locations with very few of them. In other words, we do not limit our analysis to large metropolitan areas. Small localities are worthy of attention because, if anything, agglomeration e¤ects should be comparatively larger there: a local productivity shock is more likely to snowball to other …rms if agglomeration externalities in manufacturing are an important contributor to town formation. The data also include many small …rms, a feature that may a¤ect our results regarding entry and exit. The role of the rapid growth of new entrants in the creation major industrial hubs -e.g., the Silicon Valley -has caught the attention of many. We want to see whether insights generated by such experiences translate to small manufacturers in a middle-income country such as Morocco.
Third, nothing in our analysis enables us to distinguish between pure externalities and general equilibrium e¤ects that are location speci…c. While the concept of Marshallian or technological externality is well de…ned in our context -it raises or lowers total factor productivity -the concept of pecuniary externality is not clearly distinguished from other general equilibrium e¤ects. 6 Ultimately, it is a matter of semantics whether we want to call agglomeration e¤ects an externality or not. With this caveat in mind, we now turn to the data.
The data
To implement the above testing strategy, we use manufacturing census data from Morocco. The data were collected by the Moroccan Ministry of Commerce and Industry every year over the period 1985 to 2001. Coverage is universal and includes all manufacturing enterprises in all sectors and all parts of the country. Given that answering the annual census questionnaire is a legal obligation, the rate of non-answer is fairly small -12% over the entire period. 7 These data have already been studied by others. The …rst years of this data set have been used by Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) to examine export behavior. The relationship between exports and productivity is also studied by Fafchamp et al. (2008) . Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) test the e¤ect of agglomeration externalities on total factor productivity and wages. Fafchamps and Schundeln (2013) show that local bank availability is associated with faster growth for small and medium-size …rms in sectors with growth opportunities, with a lower likelihood of …rm exit and a higher likelihood of investment.
The sectoral decomposition identi…es 17 di¤erent sectors corresponding roughly to the 2-digit ISIC classi…cation. Because 3 of the sectors have very few …rms, for the sake of the analysis we combine them with other similar sectors, bringing the total number of sectors to 14. Data is available for all years on output, employment, wage payments, investment, and disbursed capital (a balance sheet equity concept). Capital stock information is available for and Matsuyama 1996). Elsewhere (e.g., Romer 1986 , Rodriguez-Clare 1996 , Fafchamps 1997 , pecuniary externalities describe multiplier e¤ects. Our empirical analysis can neither identify multiple equilibria nor distinguish multiplier e¤ects that arise from normal general equilibrium feedbacks from those that arise from pecuniary externalities. 7 For the purpose of generating national and regional statistics, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry imputed values individually for each non-responding …rm. Imputation was typically done using previous year information. Imputed …rms are ignored in the regression analysis but to minimize measurement error imputed employment …gures for non-respondent …rms are used in computing the agglomeration variables described in the previous section. the year 2001. Employment …gures are separated into permanent and casual workers, the latter …gure being given in total number of days per year. We divide the number of man-days by 256 to transform man-days of casual labor into permanent employee equivalent. 8 To facilitate comparison, we de ‡ate all output …gures using sector-speci…c GDP price de ‡ator. Investment data is de ‡ated using the price index for machinery. 9 Location information varies over time. From 1985 From until 1993 , the manufacturing census only recorded the province in which the …rm was located. This period correspond to a trade liberalization phase (Haddad and de Melo 1996) . From 1994 until 1997, the data also recorded the city code and from 1998 on the precise commune location of each …rm was recorded. Morocco is divided into 70 provinces, 67 of which count at least one manufacturing …rm over the study period. Starting from 1993, the data distinguishes between 242 cities. From 1998, …rm location data is available at the commune level. There are approximately 1300 communes in Morocco, 689 of which had at least one manufacturing …rm over the study period.
These data are used to construct three sets of location and sector speci…c variables: at the commune, city, and province level. Commune and city aggregates can be computed from 1998 until 2001 and from 1994 until 2001, respectively. Province aggregates can be computed for the whole span of the data, that is, from 1985 until 2001. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 . The table is organized a way that mirrors the subsequent analysis: each observation corresponds to a sector, location, and year with at least one active …rm. Locations with no manufacturing are omitted form the table -they provide no information about agglomeration e¤ects. The three panels correspond to the varying level of geographical detail available in the census data.
Average sectoral employment at the commune level is around 360 workers. The median is much lower at 53. Total manufacturing employment in the commune is a little over 4000 on average. There are on average around 5 …rms in each sector and commune, with a smaller median of 2. The corresponding value of the (unnormalized) competition index C ijt is 2.7, hence falling roughly between 1, which corresponds to complete concentration, and N ijt which correspond to complete equality conditional on N ijt . Around 8 of the 14 sectors are present in a commune on average. The average (unnormalized) diversity index D it is 3.3, which similarly falls between 1 and M it . Entry, exit, and movement across locations are presented next. We see that the number of entering and exiting …rms are roughly of the same order of magnitude. This is consistent with the relative stagnation of Moroccan manufacturing in the late 1990's. The exit rate is high: in any given year 10% of all …rms exit. This re ‡ects the small nature of many of the …rms in the manufacturing census. Small …rms are indeed known to have a higher churning rate (e.g., Barrett 1994 , Daniels 1997 . We also see that many …rms move across locations. By the nature of the data, no information on …rms exiting or moving out is available for the last year, hence the smaller number of observations. As suggested by the large di¤erence between the mean and the median, investment I ijt is highly skewed. This is normal given the predominance of small …rms in the sample (e.g., Bigsten et al. 2004 ).
The second and third panels show similar statistics when geographical location is de…ned at the level of the city and province, respectively. While there are on average 18.5 communes per province, the number of communes with manufacturing employment is only 2.9 times the number of provinces. This suggests that, within each province, manufacturing employment is geographically concentrated in a few communes. Comparison between the three panels indicates that values are roughly multiplied by 2.5-3 between the commune and province data. Because of this -and the used of lagged variations -there is much larger number of usable years when using province instead of commune data, in spite of the reduction in the number of locations.
Productivity and wages
Before we turn to the estimation of our model of interest, we need to generate the productivity variables. Ideally, we would like to have information on total factor productivity in volume, plus data on output prices, wages, and input costs -since theoretically they can all channel externalities. In practice, we do not have information on output prices and input costs. Consequently, we focus our attention on wages and total factor productivity in value.
Wage w ijt is obtained by dividing, for each …rm, the total annual wage bill by the number of employees. 10 We then take the median of the location and sector as our wage measure w ijt .
The median is preferred to the mean because it is less sensitive to measurement error. 11
To obtain an estimate of total factor productivity in value, we estimate, for each …rm k in our sample, a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
where Q kt is the value of output, L casual kt is the number of casual workers (in permanent employee equivalent units), and Z kt is a vector of control variables including the log of the …rm's age, the bias, the two labor variables are also instrumented using the same variables used to predict capital, namely, lagged labor, …rm equity, a dummy if the …rm existed in the previous year, and variables measuring lagged investment. All values are de ‡ated using sector-speci…c de ‡ators.
Results are presented in Table 2 . The show that this simple, parsimonious model accounts for more than three fourth of the variation in …rm output. Labor and capital share parameters take reasonable values.
The residuals b e kt from equation (4.1) are then obtained. The median residual b e kt for a given sector, year, and location is our measure of …rm total factor productivity p ijt . Together, w ijt and p ijt form the P ijt vector. The reader should keep in mind that since we cannot construct an input price variable, we cannot control for possible productivity e¤ects that take place via intermediate inputs or service costs.
Dynamic panel analysis
We now turn to the dynamic panel analysis. We begin with the output growth equation (2.6).
All regressors are in logs. 13 Results for equation (2.6) are reported in Table 3 using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . 14 Robust standard errors are used throughout. Since we do not (2017) . A small number of …rm characteristics such as age, legal status, foreign or public ownership, as well as sectoral and location dummies are included as regressors. Time varying predictors include lagged labor and share of casual workers, investment and lagged investment, dummies for whether the …rm invested in the current and previous period, and a dummy for whether is in its …rst year of existence, in which case all lagged values are set to zero. This parsimonious model explains two thirds of the variation in capital stock across …rms in 2001. 1 3 Productivity shocks b e kt are by construction expressed in logs. 1 4 Following the recommendation of Arellano and Bond (1991) , we report one-step GMM estimates throughout because two-step estimates are known to seriously underestimate standard errors in …nite samples. This is con…rmed in our case: two-step estimates are very similar to one-step estimates, but t values are unrealistically large. To check for robustness, we also estimate equation (2.6) using the slitghly less e¢ cient instrumental variable method suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) . All pre-determined di¤erenced regressors are instrumented using lagged levels. without and with productivity variables p ijt and w ijt . The number of observations increases as one moves from commune to city to province data, re ‡ecting the increase in the number of usable years of data. At the bottom of this Table -and subsequent Tables -we report autocorrelation tests on the residuals. 15 We also report a joint test of the agglomeration variables A ijt and productivity variables P ijt . Since we control for …xed e¤ects, all reported coe¢ cients are purged of time-invariant location and sector-speci…c e¤ects, such as those that could be due to pure geographical advantages.
Results are broadly similar across the three sets of regressions: inference does not appear to depend on the geographical unit of analysis. This is probably due to the fact that communes with manufacturing activity tend to be located close to each other within each city and province.
We …nd a large and positive coe¢ cient on lagged output Q ijt , indicating a lot of persistence in economic activity. Total employment in location L it has a strong negative e¤ect in all three regressions, suggesting that the presence of manufacturing employment has a negative e¤ect on manufacturing growth. This is consistent with the existence of negative agglomeration externalities due to congestion. The competition index C ijt is positive and signi…cant in all three regressions: less concentration within a sector is bene…cial to growth in this sector. The number is virtually identical.
1 5 The Arellano and Bond estimator is known to be consistent under …rst order autocorrelation, but not under second order autocorrelation. A Sargan overidenti…cation test was also conducted. When calculated under the assumption of homoskedastic errors, the Sargan test is known to over-reject the null in the presence of heteroskedasticity in this category of models. Sargan tests based on the two-step model, which corrects for heteroskedasticity, all fail to reject overidenti…cation.
of manufacturing sectors present in a location has a positive e¤ect on manufacturing output growth, but the e¤ect is only signi…cant in the …rst regression. In contrast, the diversity index D it is everywhere negative, signi…cantly so in the city and province regressions. Taken together, these results appear to reject Jacobs'idea that manufacturing diversity is bene…cial to growth: locations with less diversi…ed manufacturing on average grow faster.
Adding the two productivity variables to the regression does not, contrary to expectations, reduce the e¤ect of agglomeration variables L it ; M it ; C ijt and D it ; in most cases it even magni…es their coe¢ cient, as evidenced by higher individual t-values and a higher Wald test statistic for joint signi…cance (see bottom of Table 3 ). This ‡ies in the face of the idea that agglomeration e¤ects on growth operate through productivity. Variable p ijt also behave in an unexpected manner: contrary to expectations, it has a strong negative coe¢ cient in all three sets of regressions. This means that, controlling for time-invariant sector and location e¤ects, a rise in productivity at time t is associated with slower growth of output at time t + 1. This result contradicts the idea that productivity gains are what fuels manufacturing growth at the local level. In contrast, the wage variable has the anticipated negative sign: a rise in local manufacturing wages at t leads to slower output growth at t + 1, possibly because …rms leave the location for another one with lower labor costs. We revisit this hypothesis below.
One likely explanation for the negative sign on p ijt is that productivity in value is subject to non-persistent shocks: as productivity reverts towards its mean after a large positive shock, output tends to fall. This interpretation …nds some support in the results: once we control for past productivity, the coe¢ cient on lagged output rises above one in all three regressions. This means that if output rises at t for reasons other than a productivity shock (e.g., because of investment or …rm entry), this rise leads to an even faster increase in output in subsequent periods. In contrast, if output rises at t because of a productivity shock, it tends to fall subse-quently, suggesting that the productivity shock was short-lived. No matter what the underlying mechanism, this …ndings ‡ies in the face of the idea that productivity shocks snowball through the economy, generating positive feedbacks between …rms and triggering a virtuous growth cycle.
This is not what we observe in Moroccan manufacturing.
To investigate this further, we estimate equation (2.7) which include L ijt , N ijt and K ijt as additional regressors. As indicated earlier, these variables are regarded as pre-determined in the estimation, and thus their di¤erences are instrumented with lagged levels. Regression results are presented in Table 4 . Inference regarding agglomeration and productivity variables is basically unchanged by the presence of L ijt , N ijt and K ijt : whatever agglomeration and productivity variables are measuring, it is not past …rm expansion. As anticipated, the introduction of the new regressors brings down the coe¢ cient of lagged output below 1. But estimated coe¢ cients for L ijt , N ijt and K ijt are highly variable -switching sign and signi…cance from one regression to the other. Results for employment and number of …rms are by and large inconclusive, probably because multicollinearity with lagged levels of output and capital precludes reliable identi…ca-tion. Results are slightly more stable for capital: once we control for past productivity shocks, investment at t is associated with a fall in output at t + 1. We revisit this puzzling result below.
To investigate issues more in detail, we turn to the e¤ect that agglomeration and productivity variables may have directly on investment, employment growth, and …rm entry and exit. We begin with employment growth, which has been the primary focus of much of the literature to date. Results are presented in Table 5 , again using the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator.
Other estimation details are the same as in Table 4 . 16 We again …nd evidence of a lot of persistence, with coe¢ cients on lagged employment ‡uc-tuating between 0.68 and 1.05, depending on the regression. An increase in the number of …rms at t is associated with employment growth at t + 1. This is consistent with the idea that new …rms go through an initial period of rapid growth as they converge to their …rm-speci…c steady state. Surprisingly, passed changes in capital stock are not re ‡ected in subsequent employment growth. To verify whether this result is due to the fact that we are using predicted capital in lieu of actual capital stock, we reestimate the model using the simpler Anderson and Hsiao approach. This enables us to used lagged investment instead of change in predicted capital stock. 17 Results, not shown here to save space, are identical: it is not the reliance on predicted capital stock that accounts for the non-signi…cant coe¢ cient on capital.
The e¤ect of agglomeration variables on the growth of sectoral employment is by and large identical to their e¤ect on output: total employment L it and diversity D it have strong negative e¤ects, while the competition index C ijt is strongly positive. Within-sector competition thus appears bene…cial to employment growth while total manufacturing employment and sectoral diversity have negative e¤ects. The number of sectors M it appears with a signi…cantly positive coe¢ cient in the commune data, but the e¤ect disappears as we move to the province data.
This suggests that the e¤ect of M it may have changed over time or depends strongly on the size of the geographical unit.
Productivity variables p ijt and w ijt , in contrast, behave in a completely di¤erent way compared to their e¤ect on output: both variables have positive e¤ects in the commune, city and province regressions. The level of signi…cance of the productivity variable remains low, however.
What these results imply is that a rise in productivity or wages at time t leads to a subsequent rise in employment at t + 1. For productivity, this e¤ect is what theory predicts: as productivity increases, …rms hire more workers. But the e¤ect of w ijt is contrary to theory: manufacturing employment is seen to increase after a rise in manufacturing wages.
Turning to investment, we again …nd evidence of persistence (see Table 6 ). But the coe¢ cient of lagged capital is much lower than that of labor -between 0.37 and 0.58 compared to 0.68 to 1.05. This is consistent with the observation that, in poor countries, investment is sporadic, perhaps due to convexity in adjustment costs (e.g., Bigsten et al. 2004) . In further contrast with Table 5 , we …nd that lagged employment growth has a strong e¤ect on investment: locations and sectors that have expanded employment in the past tend to experience more investment in the future. Put di¤erently, employment growth tends to lead investment instead of the contrary, as is often assumed. This again is consistent with the existence of convex adjustment costs or option e¤ects: …rms increase employment before investing (e.g., Dixit 1989, Dixit and Pindyck 1994) .
Agglomeration variables have by and large the same e¤ect on investment as they have on employment, so we need not discuss them again. But p ijt and w ijt behave in a di¤erent manner.
Here we …nd a strong and robust association between past productivity increases and investment: locations and sectors that experienced a large increase in productivity at t are more likely to invest at t+1. Since positive productivity shocks are associated with a subsequent fall in output, this suggests that …rms may be behaving in a myopic manner, failing to see that the current productivity shock is short-lived. An alternative explanation is that …rms are credit constrained.
By raising current revenues, a favorable productivity shock enables …rms to undertake investment that they could not previously undertake (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988 , Hubbard 1998 , Bigsten et al. 1999 , Fafchamps and Oostendorp 2002 , Nkurunziza 2010 , Fafchamps and Schulndeln 2013 . Table 7 shows a similar regression analysis for the number of …rms N ijt . Results suggest a very high level of persistence for …rm numbers: the coe¢ cient on lagged N ijt oscillates between 0.89 and 1.5. Lagged employment and capital are only signi…cant in the province regression, labor with a positive coe¢ cient and capital with a negative one. Put di¤erently, employment growth at t is associated with net …rm entry at t + 1 while investment at t seems to lead to …rm exit. The …rst e¤ect suggests that when existing …rms expand employment, new …rms enter. Alternatively, when existing …rms cut down their workforce, displaced workers seek selfemployment through the creation of small …rms. The second e¤ect may be due to the fact that investment by existing …rms displaces smaller …rms, hence leading to …rm exit -e.g., if self-employed workers close their …rm to join the workforce of larger …rms. While agglomeration variables again have the same e¤ect on net …rm entry, p ijt and w ijt are non-signi…cant, except
for wages which appears with a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient in the province regression.
We further investigate …rm entry by decomposing log N ijt into gross entry, …rm in-migration, …rm out-migration, and gross exit and estimating equation (2.8). As explained in Section 2, the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond does not strictly apply. The model is therefore estimate using the Anderson and Hsiao approach of instrumenting …rst di¤erences with lagged levels.
Results are summarized in Table 8 . Robust standard errors and a 10% signi…cance level are used for inference purposes. Since exit and out-migration appear as negative variables, the signs of all coe¢ cient is immediately comparable.
We …nd that persistence a¤ects all four dependent variables: a larger number of …rms increases entry and in-migration and reduces exit and out-migration. The positive e¤ect of employment on N ijt that is signi…cant in the province regression appears to take place through increased gross entry and reduced out-migration; exit and in-migration are not a¤ected. The negative e¤ect of investment on N ijt in the province regression appears driven primarily by increased …rm exit. Agglomeration variables a¤ect our four dependent variables di¤erently. Total employment L it depresses N ijt via its e¤ect on entry, exit, and out-migration. In contrast, …rm in-migration does not appear to be a¤ected by changes in L it over time. The number of sectors, which is non-signi…cant in Table 7 , tends to be non-signi…cant here as well, except for a few regressions where the e¤ect in signi…cantly negative. Much of the negative e¤ect of diversity on N ijt appears to be due to reduced gross entry. Diversity also tends to reduce out-migration and …rm exit, but the e¤ect is only signi…cant in the commune regression.
Competition has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect in most regressions: less concentration reduces …rm exit and out-migration while encouraging more entry and in-migration. According to the literature (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982 , Clerides et al. 1998 , Das, Roberts and Tybout 2001 , Haddad and Norton 2001 , the e¤ect of competition on productivity is thought to come from the elimination of ine¢ cient …rms and entry by newer, more productive …rms. In this case, we would expect that increased competition increases both entry and exit. This is not what we …nd.
Finally, p ijt is seen to have a negative e¤ect on …rm in-migration and a positive e¤ect on exit in the city regressions. The wage variable w ijt , in contrast, tends to raise entry and reduce exit in the province regression. Neither results are consistent with the agglomeration externality idea that locations with favorable productivity shocks attract new …rms, or that higher wages drive …rms away.
Conclusion
The literature has attempted to provide evidence of agglomeration externalities by regressing sectoral employment growth on variables meant to capture location-speci…c specialization, competition, and diversity (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992 , Henderson 1997 , Combes 2000 , Combes et al. 2004 , Bun and Makhlou… 2007 . Evidence of an in ‡uence of agglomeration variables on growth has generally been taken as evidence of productivity e¤ects. In this paper, we have tested the validity of this approach in two ways: by controlling directly for productivity, and by comparing results obtained using employment growth with those using output, investment, and …rm entry and exit. What makes these improvements possible is detailed and exhaustive …rm-level data available over an extended period of time. In our econometric analysis, we control for location and sector speci…c …xed e¤ects and correct for the fact that some regressors are pre-determined.
We …nd strong and robust evidence of agglomeration e¤ects. Moreover, none of our results depends on the level of geographical disaggregation: we obtain similar …ndings whether working with commune, city, or province data. This is hardly surprising given that, within provinces, manufacturing remains concentrated in a few nearby locations. Our results show that a rise in total manufacturing employment in a locality predicts a negative growth in output, employment, capital, and number of …rms in the following year. We also …nd that sectoral concentration is inimical to growth: locations and sectors where …rms are of equal size tend to grow faster in terms of output, employment, and capital. Firm entry is also higher. Finally, locations with equal distribution of employment across various manufacturing sectors grow signi…cantly slower, again in terms of output, employment, capital, and number of …rms. If we interpret these results as other authors have done, we would conclude that competition is good for growth -and diversity bad -because of their e¤ect on productivity.
Other …ndings, however, cast some doubt on this interpretation. First, agglomeration variables have an e¤ect on local sectoral growth that is virtually opposite to the one they have on individual …rm productivity. Indeed, using the same data set Fafchamps and El Hamine (2017) estimate the e¤ect of agglomeration variables on wages and total factor productivity at the individual …rm level. They …nd that competition reduces productivity while diversity raises it -the opposite result from what we …nd here.
Second, if agglomeration variables in ‡uence manufacturing growth through their e¤ect on productivity, controlling for productivity directly should eliminate or, at the very least, reduce the signi…cance of agglomeration variables. In our detailed analysis, we …nd instead that none of the agglomeration e¤ects is seriously a¤ected when we introduce measures of total factor productivity: in none of our regressions do productivity variables lower the signi…cance of agglomeration variables. Agglomeration variables capture something that is relevant to …rm growth, but it is not total factor productivity in value.
To be fair, our productivity variables do not always behave as anticipated either. In particular, past productivity shocks tend to lower future output growth. We interpret this …nding as consistent with the idea that productivity shocks are not very persistent; reversion to the mean implies slower future growth. We also …nd that a rise in productivity raises subsequent employment and investment, but has no e¤ect on …rm entry and exit. The e¤ect is particularly strong on investment, suggesting that …rms invest more in the wake of a positive productivity shock when revenues are high, possibly because they are liquidity constrained (e.g., Hubbard 1998 , Bigsten et al. 1999 , Bigsten et al. 2003 ).
The analysis presented here raises many new questions. The literature has relied on certain variables thought to a¤ect productivity in order to measure agglomeration externalities. Our …ndings suggest that this approach is unreliable, at least in the context of Morocco: agglomeration variables do not have on …rm-level productivity the same e¤ect that they have on aggregate growth, and they do not in ‡uence manufacturing growth via their presumed e¤ect on productivity. Yet agglomeration variables are strong and robust predictors of manufacturing growth.
What is unclear is why. But we can speculate.
First, over the study period, Moroccan manufacturing is a relatively small sector of the economy heavily concentrated in three sectors -garment, textiles, and leather products -that account for 80% of all manufacturing employment and are heavily exported (e.g., Zeufack 2008, Fafchamps 2009 ). The Moroccan textile and garment value chain is extremely short, with heavy reliance on cut-and-trim 18 sub-contracting for European buyers, predominantly in France and Spain. Production orders are short -a few days -and the manpower is largely composed of female casual workers. The three sectors are subject to large demand swings driven by shocks in foreign demand and competitivity with Chinese exports.
This means that vertical linkages within the manufacturing sector are minimal and production is heavily dependent on conditions abroad. This leaves less room for agglomeration e¤ects operating through industrial linkages and pecuniary externalities through local demand. Since …rms compete for the same export orders, productivity shocks -i.e., above average sales -do not di¤use across …rms. This may explain why we do not …nd evidence of agglomeration e¤ect through productivity di¤usion.
Secondly, manufacturing in Morocco is characterized by the coexistence of medium to large scale modern …rms, with small survivalist enterprises created primarily to make ends meet. This is associated with wide disparities in the productivity level and management practices of …rms (Bloom and van Reenen 2007) . When medium to large …rms shed workers, small …rms pick up the slack until jobs in medium to large …rms are restored. We believe this pendulum process explains some of the …ndings regarding the entry and exit of …rms in response to productivity shocks and agglomeration e¤ects.
Third, we have looked for evidence of agglomeration e¤ects at a fairly disaggregated geographical level. As a result, the sample used for estimation counts a lot small localities, many of which are dominated by small informal …rms. This means that our …ndings are heavily in ‡u-enced by what happens to small …rms. Because they have very di¤erent management practices from large …rms, we also suspect that informal sector …rms may not bene…t from the same ag-1 8 In cut-and-trim, the buyer supplies all the designs and raw materials (e.g., fabric, buttons). This is related to the fact that Moroccan garment manufacturing partly serves the role of stop-gap supplier for large French and Spanish department stores: when they stock-out on a mass-produced garment in China and they wish to restock their inventories at short notice, they sub-contract Moroccan manufacturers on a cut-and-trim basis. This singularly reduces opportunities for vertical linkages. glomeration externalities as those that bene…t modern …rms. In particular, small …rms would not be able to absorb innovations in technology and management that spread through modern …rms. This may explain why, in our data, past productivity improvements do not predict future growth in sales.
While these features may explain why our …ndings di¤er from what has been found in more advanced economies with large modern manufacturing, it does not imply that they are uninteresting. Quite the contrary. To date the literature has approached agglomeration externalities in a fairly monolithic way, as if they applied equally in all economies. Given what we now know of the lower tail of the …rm productivity distribution in developing countries (Bloom and van Reenen 2007) , it is not too surprising that they do not bene…t from agglomeration through the di¤usion of productivity shocks. More likely, they conglomerate where local demand is, creating congestion and strong competition among them, and this what we pick up in our results.
To conclude, we have found agglomeration e¤ects in Moroccan manufacturing but have found no evidence that they are due to productivity spillovers across …rms. When we consider the nature of manufacturing in the country at that time, this may not been so surprising after all. If so, we need to reconsider the nature of agglomeration externalities in the developing world, and especially in Africa. Urbanization has spawned a myriad of small …rms there, and our dominant models of industrial development appear in need of a rethink before we can successfully apply them to these new towns and cities. 
